The idea of inter-regional divergence followed by convergence is one of the cornerstones of the regional development literature. It is expected that interregional inequality (expressed typically in terms of per capita regional income or output) increases during the early years/decades of industrial development, being concentrated in metropolitan areas, and begins to decline at some later indeterminate point. This approach includes the pioneering work
, into the contributions of new growth scholars like Krugman [1996] , Sala-i-Martin [1996] , and Fujita, Krugman and Venables [1999] . These scholars have based their work on different political, economic, and analytical assumptions, but they have led to similar outcomes, albeit with different degrees of sanguineness (Myrdal, for instance, was far less hopeful than Hirschman about the possibility of convergence as a 'natural' eventual outcome). The key to long run interregional change, in all of this literature, is the role of industrialisation, especially its spatial manifestation, or what in the last decade or so is being called geographic concentration or clustering. 1 Three main (overlapping) strands of this literature can be identified. The Hirschman and Myrdal approach can be considered under the umbrella of 'cumulative causation', in which, 'since nothing succeeds like success', early industrial cities capture much of the new physical, human, and financial capital, often at the cost of peripheral and rural regions. This is the phase of polarisation (according to Hirschman) or backwash (according to Myrdal) and may be followed by trickle down or spread, primarily when there is effective political action. Perhaps the most commonly used framework is the second strand of this literature, in which the tension between agglomeration economies and diseconomies govern urban/ metropolitan size, and less directly, the location of industry [Richardson, 1973; Henderson, 1988] .
In these export-driven models of urban and regional change, the key is not political action, but the rise and fall of agglomeration advantages which are derived from thick labour markets, knowledge spillovers, vertical process integration, and so on. The third and most recent strand of this literature is the most analytical and identifies transport-cost as the crucial variable. The authors [Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999] build a series of 'increasing returns' models of cities, regions, and industries, where selfperpetuating forces of geographic concentration are for a time supported by, and later (in some circumstances) offset by declining transport costs. These insightful models provide, for the most part, renewed analytical support for the cumulative causation arguments made in earlier decades, and on the role of agglomeration economies and industrial clustering.
These lines of reasoning -cumulative causation, agglomeration economies, or transport-cost driven 'divergence followed by convergence' theories -presume regime or policy continuity; that is, it is taken for granted that the regulatory conditions under which industrial location decisions are taken do not change. An added complication in such spatial analytical frameworks is that the rules have recently changed. Whether or not a 'Washington Consensus' or 'Universal Convergence' exists [Williamson, 2000] , it is undeniable that over the past two decades more than a hundred developing nations have undertaken structural reforms that have liberalised their regulatory strictures on who can locate where. The incentive and disincentive systems of the past (which notionally tended to favour lagging, unindustrialised, non-metropolitan regions) have been largely discarded; the new systems profess to have little geographical orientation, but, as many have argued, may be biased towards advanced, industrialised, metropolitan regions [Chakravorty, 2000] , in other words, biased in favour of existing industrial clusters.
Conversely, Elizondo and Krugman [1992] suggest that post-reform regional industrialisation is likely to lose its historical metropolitan bias. They argue that the magnitude of internal trade is much larger than foreign trade in inward looking trade regimes; 'this leads to concentration of production and trading activities in large metropolitan cities … an opening up of the economy is likely to break the monopoly power of these highly concentrated production and trading centres, weaken the traditional forward and backward linkages and lead to a more even distribution of economic activities across regions' [Das and Barua, 1996: 365] . Similarly, according to Gilbert [1993: 729] 'the cities which benefited most from the previous development model have suddenly had an important prop to their growth removed' in the new regimes of liberalisation and export orientation.
This brings us to the fundamental questions being examined in this article: where do new industrial investments locate, and what forces or factors drive the location decisions? Do these investments follow the model of 'divergence followed by convergence' suggested by the cumulative causation, agglomeration economies, and transport-costs approaches? I examine the questions with data from India using the 1991 reforms as the point of departure. The question is examined in two steps: first, I present a series of tabular and graphical data on Indian industry, aggregated for all industry and disaggregated into five sectors (Heavy Industries, Chemicals and Petroleum, Textiles, Agribusiness, and Utilities). The data provide solid, if less than conclusive evidence that there is not a single definitive answer to the questions posed here; that is, there is evidence both of interregional concentration and intraregional dispersal. Second, I present two sets of regression models (for all industry and the five sectors listed above) which provide further confirmation that 'concentrated decentralisation' is the appropriate framework for understanding industrial location in the post-reform period in India.
I will dispense with any detailed discussion of India's reforms. There is already a large literature on the subject, on which opposing viewpoints can be found in Byres [1997] and Joshi and Little [1997] . Dehejia [1993: 88] provides a good early summary of the extent of the reforms:
The most striking achievement of the reforms [has been] that commercial considerations, rather than government mandates, are now the determinant in all investment decisions, including ownership, location, local content, technology fees, and royalty. The approval authority in the Directorate General of Technical Development in the Ministry of Industries has been eliminated. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act has been amended … Controls on the import of capital goods have been removed, and the many regulatory bodies [have been] dissolved or reconstructed … States now compete with each other to attract new investments.
The literature on Indian industry, which will not be referred to after this section, tends to fall into two broad categories: (1) non-analytical, policyoriented approaches that focus on the details of the regulatory system governing Indian industrialisation. There are few works written from a geographical standpoint, being limited to descriptive approaches to regional inequality in industrialisation or the spatial distribution of industry in specific states or regions [Verma, 1986; Saha 1987; National Commission on Urbanisation, 1988; Awasthi, 1991] ; (2) non-spatial analysis of industrial productivity and growth, good examples of which are found in the writings of Shukla [1984] , Ahluwalia [1991] , Becker, Williamson and Mills [1992] , Das and Barua [1996] and others. There have been several empirical estimations of production functions; for a good survey see Goldar [1997] . At the end, there is little analytical information on the location of industry in India -its patterns and underlying causes, the relationships with urban/metropolitan regions -let alone any analysis of the changes in industrial location as a result of the reforms.
DATA ISSUES
One of the primary reasons why little spatially disaggregated industrial analysis has been undertaken in India has been the absence of appropriate data. Indian industrial data are fairly readily available at the state level, but, for the kind of disaggregated analysis required here, state level data are virtually useless. The two largest states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, before their recent break-ups, had about 150 and 100 million people respectively; if independent, these would be among the largest countries in the world. The next largest political unit in the country is the District. There are approximately 470 districts -the number is not fixed (just as the number of states is not fixed) because new districts are carved out of old ones on a fairly regular basis, more so in the 1990s than ever before. Data at the district level, however, have generally been unavailable.
The Pre-Reform Data
The Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), which has the responsibility of collecting and disseminating most data on the Indian economy, publishes the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The ASI lists sectorally disaggregated industrial data at the state level. Though the ASI data are collected at a smaller scale (the Block), they had never been made available at the block or district level. The ASI covers every factory and manufacturing unit (designated so by the Factories Act of 1948, amended in 1956) using two methods: a 'census' sector survey with 100 per cent coverage of units employing 100 or more persons, and a 'sample' sector survey in which a sample of the smaller units (employing between 20 and 99 persons) is statistically allocated to all districts. The census sector covers over 80 per cent of the formal sector of Indian industry and is considered to be more reliable than the sample sector. I was fortunate to be given access to the district level data from the 1994 census sector ASI for six variables (number of factories, fixed capital, invested capital, number of employees, value of output, and net value added) at the two digit code level (that is, for 29 different categories of industry). The survey on which these data are based was carried out in 1993-94, two years after the initiation of reforms. However, since the survey covers every unit that was in operation in 1993-94, whenever built, this is the most realistic measure of Indian industry for the pre-reform period. When I refer to pre-reform data the numbers have been derived from this data set.
Note that the ASI data have several problems. First, since the definition of industry was set by the Factories Act, certain types of establishments such as software manufacturers and everything in the service sector, are not covered by the ASI. This is likely to affect the estimates for districts like Bangalore in Karnataka and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, which by reputation at least, have attracted significant investments in the software sector. Second, the ASI covers only the formal sector of India's industrial economy. The number of employees covered, for instance, is less than ten million, which clearly is a far lower number than the true size of the population engaged in formal and informal industrial activity.
The Post-Reform Data Surprisingly, no government agency has been tracking new post-reform investments. The economic data being generated by a private sector firm, the Center for Monitoring (the) Indian Economy (CMIE), is generally considered to be the most reliable. CMIE publishes a quarterly list of investment projects with markers for location (state, district, and place), project stage (completed, under implementation, seeking approvals and so on), product, capital cost and so forth. These data from 1992 to February 1998 have been collated into a database of 4,650 records including only those projects that have been completed or are under implementation; it is sensible to ignore the projects still in the 'proposal' or 'announcement' phase as their future is quite uncertain, and those that are being funded solely by local government. The 1991 data were ignored as they were unlikely to be an accurate list of 'new' investments; after all, the reforms had only been announced in July 1991. This database of 4,650 records or projects covering the period 1992 through February 1998 forms the basis of all the post-reform calculations.
The CMIE data are also likely to have problems. Primarily, it is possible that the CMIE's method of data collection has introduced some bias; their lists were compiled from official announcements (on the granting of Letters of Intent, or the signing of Memoranda of Understanding and so on), press reports, and company announcements and reports. This is unlikely to generate a complete list. Second, since the CMIE is Mumbai-based, its information on the west may be better than for other zones (especially the farthest zone, the east). As a result their lists may be biased toward showing relatively more investment in the west. But it is expected that both problems are likely to be true for small projects (perhaps Rs 500 million or less), as bigger projects will have generated enough publicity through various media that they are likely to have been included in the CMIE lists.
Data Aggregation
A note on the data aggregation scheme used here is necessary at this point. The ASI data were reported at the 2 digit National Industrial Classification (or NIC) code. The CMIE data are project data and have not received NIC codes yet. The two data sets were made compatible using the following method: first, the ASI data, which are reported in 26 NIC 2-digit codes, were further aggregated into six sectors: Heavy Industries, Chemicals and Petroleum, Textiles, Agribusiness, Utilities, and Other (as shown in Table  1 ). The analysis was carried out for all industry (that is, all 26 2-digit NIC categories combined together), and for the first five of the sectors identified here (the 'Other' category, which is not internally coherent, was not used for analysis). The ASI format was then used to assign general classification codes to the CMIE-listed (or post-reform) projects. In the following sections the results for all industry and the five sectors are separately presented wherever possible. Source: Own calculations from the ASI and CMIE data (discussed in text). Source: Own calculations from the ASI and CMIE data (discussed in text). 
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PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 'invested capital' from the ASI or pre-reform data, and project cost from the CMIE or post-reform data).
3 Table 2 contains data on pre-and post-reform investment at the state level.
4 Table 3 lists the investment data for the top districts. Table 4 shows the results of calculations for industry concentration and clustering.
Investments at the State Level
Let us begin at the state level with pre-and post-reform investment data for all industry, and the Heavy Industries, Chemicals and Utilities sectors as reported in Table 2 Notes: The Gini coefficient is a measure of concentration and is calculated from
Where, G i = Gini coefficient for industry i, m = number of districts, r ik = the rank of district k for industry i, p ik = the investment share of district k for industry i. investment in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and most of Madhya Pradesh. While the Heavy Industries sector investments are generally widely spread out (barring the exceptions noted), all other sectors show pronounced bias towards the coasts, the western states, parts of the south, and a northern cluster in Punjab and Haryana. Table 2 confirms these findings, and also shows that some significant changes have taken place from the pre-to the post-reform period. The most notable change is in the western region where we see a decline of Maharashtra's share and the rise of Gujarat as an investment magnet. Maharashtra is the leading industrial state in India, and over 18 per cent of all pre-reform invested capital was located in the state. After the reforms Maharashtra's share has declined to 13.4 per cent. Simultaneously, Gujarat's share has risen from 10 per cent in the pre-reform period to almost 17 per cent in the post reform period.
5 Maharashtra has lost share in every sector reported here, but most spectacularly in the Chemicals and Petroleum sector (where its share has gone from over 24 per cent of the national total to under 14 per cent). It is important to note that despite the apparent decline of Maharashtra, it remains the second most favoured state in the post-reform period. An explanation for the decline is offered later.
The other 'winner' states are Karnataka (which has almost doubled its share of all industry, and gained significantly in every sector), Assam (led by investments in the Chemicals and Petroleum sector), Orissa (which has benefited primarily in Heavy Industries, with almost 12 per cent of the national total in that sector), and Madhya Pradesh (also a significant gainer in the Heavy Industries sector, and the Chemicals sector).
6 Bihar, of course, is the most notable 'loser' state, with losses in every sector, especially in Heavy Industries. Uttar Pradesh has also lost its share of industry, most notably in the Utilities sector (in the Heavy Industries sector, UP has actually gained some share). The other significant declining states include Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Kerala. 7 In the first two, the Heavy Industries sector has declined most precipitously, in the latter, the Chemicals and Petroleum sector has seen the sharpest decline.
At this point in the analysis, it is difficult to identify patterns in the location of new industrial investment. The leading states appear to have gained (as in Gujarat and Karnataka), or held their own (Tamil Nadu); But Maharashtra is a significant exception. The western and southern states have gained, and the eastern states are in decline. But Kerala in the south has declined, whereas Assam and Orissa in the east have gained. The coastal states have gained at the expense of the inland states. But again there are many exceptions -Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala on the coast, Assam and Madhya Pradesh in the interior.
Investments at the District Level
The district level data in Table 3 begin to offer some explanation. Here the top districts and their investment shares are identified for the pre-and postreform periods for all industry, and the Heavy Industries, Chemicals and Petroleum, and Utilities sectors. The figures indicate a significant change in location patterns. There are three important patterns revealed in this list:
(1) The decline of metropolitan districts: Consider the category of all industry. Only two of the top ten districts from the pre-reform period have managed to remain in the top ten in the post-reform period. These are Greater Bombay and Vishakhapatnam, both of which have lost share in the transition. Greater Bombay's experience is illuminating: it was by far the leading district in the country in the pre-reform period (with 8.23 per cent of the national fixed capital); after the reforms it is ranked sixth, with 2.75 per cent of the national total. Greater Bombay has gone from sixth on the pre-reform Heavy Industries list to out of the list altogether in the postreform period (similar to what has happened to Bangalore district); it has gone from second to third in Chemicals and Petroleum, and from first to fifteenth in Utilities. Greater Bombay's loss more than accounts for Maharashtra's total loss; in fact, ignoring Greater Bombay, the rest of Maharashtra has actually seen an increase in its share of investment. This is an important development that explains the apparent investment decline in the state. At the same time, some pre-reform top ten districts have dropped out of the post-reform top 25 list: these are Lucknow, Madras, Hyderabad, and Patiala, all urban districts with two being the central city districts of the fourth and fifth largest metropolises in India.
(2) The continuing decline of the inland region: Every district in the all industry post-reform top ten lies to the south of the Vindhyas, the somewhat imaginary line dividing north and south India. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the two largest and also landlocked states in the country, together account for a quarter of India's population, yet have only one district each in the postreform all industry top 25: Ghaziabad (at rank 11) in Uttar Pradesh, which is part of the Delhi metropolis, and Purbi Singhbhum (at rank 23), the manufacturing base of the giant Tata group. The post-reform Heavy Industries list contains these two and Dhanbad, the center of the coal industry. The Chemicals and Utilities lists are similarly sparsely populated with inland districts.
(3) The rise of non-metropolitan areas: Greater Bombay, Madras, Delhi, Hyderabad, Ahmadabad, Bangalore, Lucknow, etc. have all declined; Calcutta has improved marginally but from an extremely poor position and still cannot come close to breaking into the top 25 list. In contrast, some suburban districts have risen -such as Chengaianna (surrounding Madras), and Raigarh and Thane (around Bombay). But the most impressive performance has been shown by non-metropolitan, even non-urban districts such as Bharuch, Jamnagar, Dakshin Kannad, South Arcot, Surat, Medinipur, etc. These names are not completely new -Raigarh, Chengaianna, Surat, Bharuch, and Medinipur were already in the top 25 earlier (which is to suggest that the emergence of these districts is not entirely a result of the reforms).
This list shows the emergence of India's new industrial core -a leading edge of non-metropolitan, coastal districts that are relatively proximate to metropolitan areas. The most important of these clusters is the corridor stretching from south of Greater Bombay northward into southern Gujarat, and includes the districts of Ratnagiri, Raigarh, Greater Bombay, Pune, Thane (all in Maharashtra), and Bharuch, Surat, and Vadodara (all in Gujarat). The Mumbai metropolis is the anchor of this coastal industrial cluster which has heavy concentrations of Heavy Industry, Chemicals and Petroleum, and Utilities. The second major cluster is in the districts around (but not in) Madras district in Tamil Nadu state, where the prime attractors of new investment are Chengaianna and South Arcot districts. In other words, industrial growth has spread outwards from some (Mumbai and Chennai) of the existing core industrial districts (which in turn have declined), but not from others (Calcutta); it has also continued in some nonmetropolitan centres of heavy industry (Barddhaman and Vishakhapatnam, both with large public sector investments), and found new non-industrial locations (Ganjam in Orissa, Dakshin Kannad in Karnataka). That is, there is evidence both of clustering and dispersal of new industrial investments. Table 3 also provides some information on the extent of investment concentration in the top districts. The share of all industry investments concentrated in the top ten or top 25 districts is quite consistent over the two periods. The level of concentration is very high: the top ten districts attract about one-third and the top 25 districts attract about one-half of total investment in the country in both periods; not unexpectedly, the shares in the top districts in the other sectors -Heavy Industries, Utilities, and Chemicals -are even higher.
Concentration and Clustering at the District Level
These lists, while informative, do not include the full distribution of investments, neither is it possible to make summary judgments on the extent of concentration or clustering or change in either dimension. There is an emerging literature on industry concentration and its relationship to agglomeration, trade, and growth. This area has long been of interest to urban geographers and urban economists, and over the past decade has received renewed interest following the work of Krugman [1991; also Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Rosenthal and Strange, 2001] . Several devices to measure industry concentration have been discovered or rediscovered. Prominent among these are the 'spatial Gini' and Ellison and Glaeser's γ. These measures suffer from a common drawback, one that White [1983] termed the 'checkerboard problem', whereby these measures are not really spatial -any geographical arrangement of parcels (in this case districts) would yield the same measure of concentration. Hence 'concentration' has to be distinguished from 'clustering' where the latter is explicitly spatial; that is, geographical arrangements are incorporated in measures of clustering, which is a case of 'spatial autocorrelation'.
A note on spatial autocorrelation is necessary here. This is useful for understanding measures of clustering and for the 'spatial lag' term used in the models in the following section. The feature of spatial distributions in which proximate phenomena tend to be similar is called spatial autocorrelation; this is positive when like values cluster together (that is, high values are proximate to high values, and low values are proximate to low values) which is a clear expectation of geographers, or negative (when high and low values are proximate) which is rare and difficult to explain. In regression modelling, spatial autocorrelation creates problems similar to those caused by multicollinearity: the estimates are biased. Therefore when spatial autocorrelation exists corrective steps must be taken. One of the ways of dealing with the spatial autocorrelation problem in a regression modelling format is to add a 'spatial lag' term on the right hand side. According to Anselin [1992: 18-1] 'spatial lag is a weighted average of the values in locations neighboring each observation … if an observation on variable x at location i is represented by x i , then its spatial lag is Σ j w ij x j ', which is the sum of the product of each observation in the data set with its corresponding spatial weight.
Moran's I is a measure of spatial autocorrelation and therefore can also be used as a measure of clustering. It is given by
where, w ij is the element in the spatial weights matrix corresponding to the observation pair i,j; x i and x j are observations (investments) for locations i and j (with mean µ); and S 0 is a scaling constant (that is, the sum of all spatial weights). For Moran's I -Contiguity, the weights matrix assigns a weight of 1 to all j that are contiguous to i (that are direct neighbours), and a weight of 0 to all other j. For Moran's I -Distance, the weights matrix assigns a value of 1 to all j that are within a chosen critical distance of x, and a value of 0 to all other j. 150 kilometres is the critical distance in this case, that is, all districts whose centroids lie within 150 kilometres of the centroid of district x are assigned a spatial weight of 1. The summary measures reported in Table 4 use the Gini coefficient to measure concentration (γ was also calculated, but since the number of observations is high, it is virtually indistinguishable from the Gini), and Moran's I to measure clustering. The results are very interesting. In general, concentration and clustering processes have moved in opposite directions. Concentration has declined for all industry, Heavy Industry, and Utilities, and it has increased for Chemicals and Petroleum, Textiles, and Agribusiness. Clustering has increased for all but Chemicals and Agribusiness; for the latter, there is no evidence of clustering in the postreform data. 8 The Textiles sector is the only one where both measures have moved in the same, higher direction. Consider the implications of the general finding by looking at one instance, say Heavy Industry. The decline in concentration is to be expected from the data in Table 3 . The top districts have lost share, therefore lower ranked districts have higher shares than before. The increase in clustering suggests that the spread of Heavy Industry investment is greatest in adjacent or proximate districts. In other words, the new investments are spatially more concentrated than before. Later, after further evidence from the modeling exercise below, I will discuss these findings in terms of 'concentrated decentralisation'.
EXPLANATORY MODELS OF NEW INDUSTRY LOCATION
What are the factors that contribute to the location decision of new industry? This article began with the suggestion that concentration processes are important in the location decision. This implies that new industrial investments are likely to be located near existing industrial investments. Not only that, but new investments are likely to be near locations where other new investments are being made. That is, concentration and clustering are expressed through investments: existing or old investments, and new investments in proximate or surrounding areas respectively. In addition, some locations have advantages deriving from capital availability and capital productivity, labour availability, labour skills and labour productivity, physical and social infrastructure, political support, and spatial phenomena such as access to consumer markets and coastal regions [Hoover, 1968; Chapman and Walker, 1991; Harrington and Warf, 1995] . Hence a model of the following form may be specified:
where, I new , I old , and I lag are the log transformations of new investment, existing investment, and spatial lag of new investment respectively. Note that these variables take different sets of values depending upon the sector being analysed; that is, when all industry is under consideration, I new , I old , and I lag are those for all industry investments only. The same condition applies to each of the five other sectors being analysed.
K represents a set of two capital variables: IND-CREDIT or industrial credit, is given by the per capita lending to local industry by financial institutions, defined as the per capita bank credit to industries derived from the information on scheduled commercial bank branches, deposits and credits on the last Friday of March 1993. Source: CMIE, 1993. PROD-CAPITAL is a measure of the productivity of capital at the district level, and is calculated as the value added per unit of fixed capital for existing industry. Source: calculated from the ASI data.
L represents a set of three Labour variables: POP-DISTRICT is the log of district population. Source: CMIE, 1993 from the 1991 Census. LABOUR_INDUSTRY is the percentage of workers employed in nonhousehold manufacturing industry. Source: CMIE, 1993 from the 1991 Census. PROD-LABOUR is a measure of the productivity of labour and is calculated as the value added at the district level per unit of factory labour. Source: calculated from the ASI data.
I represents a set of three Infrastructure variables: PHYS-INFRA or physical infrastructure, is a measure of access to physical infrastructure, and is calculated as a function of proximity to national highways, airports and ports. The values of PHYS-INFRA range from 0 to 3, where 3 represents a situation where the given district has at least one national highway passing through it (weight 1), has at least one airport within 100 kilometres (weight 1), and has at least one port within 100 kilometres (weight 1 would also have to be similarly characterised. As far as this variable is meant to represent political will, which may be resistance to liberalisation, or its counterpart, enthusiasm for reforms, Bihar should be so categorised. But, understanding the lack of investment in Bihar is an important goal, and I preferred not to cloud the issue by introducing the socialist element.
S represents a set of two Spatial variables: COASTAL, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all coastal districts (57 districts were classified coastal). The identification of coastal districts is straightforward: any district on the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal has received this designation. METROPOLITAN, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all metropolitan districts that is, the core city district and the surrounding suburban districts (26 districts were classified metropolitan). I have used standard definitions of 'greater' or 'metropolitan area' for the defining the metropolitan areas of the following cities: Mumbai, Calcutta, Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Ahmedabad.
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In addition to these explanatory variables there is the I lag or 'spatial lag' term (discussed earlier) to correct for spatial autocorrelation or clustering. Recall that spatial lag can be calculated in several ways (by considering contiguity or distance, where the latter may take a large number of values). I used a number of spatial weights for analysis, but the one used here is a distance weight, where the cut-off distance is 150 kilometres, that is, for a given district i, every district whose centroid lies within 150 kilometres of the centroid of i was considered a neighbour; the average of the I new of these neighbours is the spatial lag for district i. Here Spatial lag has been calculated as the sum of the neighbouring Log I new rather than from the raw investment quantity (to mitigate the problem of lack of normality in the raw data).
The problem of spatial autocorrelation (which is relatively easily fixed) is only one of the problems of modelling this data set. The more serious problem arises, if one is to consider Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models, is that the assumption of normality of the dependent variable is seriously violated. Depending on the form of I new to be used (that is, for all industry, or Heavy Industries, or Chemicals, etc.) there are large numbers of districts that have no investment; note that these are not missing data, but are real measured absence of investment. The following list shows how many of these districts had non-zero investment: Hence, it is not possible to use OLS models on the full data set. But using only the non-zero data would not allow analysis of the absence of investment; also, there would be the possibility that the results of the nonzero investment would be biased. The solution is to use two sets of models: a logistic model set where the complete data are analysed to estimate the probability of a district receiving some investment; and an OLS/Heckman selection model set to estimate the contribution of the explanatory variables to the quantity of investment.
In the logistic models the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when there is some non-zero investment (call this 'success'), and 0 when there is no investment (call this situation 'failure'). The Wald statistic is commonly used for significance testing of the parameter estimates in logistic models. When the parameter estimate is given by ß and its asymptotic standard error given by ASE, the Wald statistic for the two-sided alternative is given by [ß/ASE] 2 . (See Agresti [1996] on the design and interpretation of logistic models.)
The problem of estimating the determinants of the quantity of new investment is investigated using the Heckman selection modeling method (also known as a Type 2 Tobit model; see Amemiya [1985] ). This is a twostep method that uses the complete data. It presumes that the zero-values for the dependent variable are actually missing values; that is, the sample is presumed to be non-randomly selected. The Heckman procedure first runs a probit model on the full data, estimates the values of a 'missing explanatory variable' resulting from the possible selection bias, and then estimates the determinants of the non-zero values using an OLS model. I have run both OLS and Heckman selection models with the data. I have reported the findings from the Heckman selection model only in the two cases (all industry and Agribusiness) with significant selection bias (indicated by the estimates of lambda, a model statistic reported for all the models). I have also reported the OLS generated adjusted R-square values for all models to indicate their predictive ability; hence, in the two cases where the Heckman selection estimates are reported, the adjusted R-square figures are from the corresponding OLS model. It is to be noted that that the Heckman selection parameter estimates, even in the two cases where there is selection bias, are virtually identical to the OLS estimates. Good surveys of the Heckman two-stage estimation process are in Vella [1998] and Winship and Mare [1992] .
MODEL FINDINGS
The logistic model results are reported in Table 5 and the OLS/Heckman selection model results are reported in Table 6 . Recall that the logistic models are to be used to identify the factors that contribute to a district getting some (as opposed to no) investment, and the OLS/Heckman selection models are to be used to identify the factors that contribute to the quantity of new investments. In the following discussion the results in the two tables are considered together and focused around the regressors or sets of independent variables. But first consider the model sets as a whole. The logistic models are generally robust and predict over 73 per cent of the distribution of districts with zero and non-zero investments. The OLS/ Heckman selection models are robust, but generally less successful in explaining the variation in the distribution of new investments. The adjusted R-square values go from a low of 0.112 for agribusiness to a high of 0.252 for all industry.
It is possible to improve the R-square values by adding variables which are known to be influential: for instance, adding dummy regional or state variables should show the attractiveness of the western region relative to the eastern region; the addition of a second spatial lag term, this time for the clustering effects of existing (or pre-reform) investment, is also likely to improve the model fit. But these adjustments would not add to our understanding of the investment distribution process. There is surely a substantial random element in the distribution, but equally likely there are non-random local factors that have not been modeled here, and that may indeed be difficult to model. These factors relate to local or state level policy changes (such as tax incentives, the location of export processing and/or free trade zones and so on), and some intangibles like culture, entrepreneurship and initiative.
10 This is an important point and will be raised again later.
The concentration variable -old investment (OLDINV) -is consistently significant in all logistic models, and in all but Chemicals and Textiles Notes: *** Significant at 1 per cent; ** Significant at 5 per cent; * Significant at 10 per cent.
Figures in parenthesis are Z scores for the Heckman models, t statistics for the OLS models.
The Adjusted R-sq's reported for the Heckman selection models are from the OLS models with the same functional forms. These are for information only. Likewise, the Wald and lambda reported for the OLS models are from the Heckman selection models with the same functional forms. As discussed in the text, the Heckman selection model data for these instances (Heavy Industry, Chemicals, Textiles, and Utilities) are not shown because the lambdas are not significant, indicating that there is no selection bias in the OLS models. among the OLS / Heckman selection models. The clustering variable -new investment in neighbouring districts (NEWINV-LAG) -is also very strongly significant in all the logistic models, but not significant for all industry, Chemicals, Textiles, or Utilities in the OLS / Heckman selection model set. The parameter estimates for NEWINV-LAG are higher, indicating that the quantity of new neighboring investment has a stronger influence on the existence and quantity of new investment in a district. Generally, we can conclude that the concentration/clustering process, expressed through existing and new nearby investments, is very important in determining whether or not a district gets any new investment, and is important, but less so, in determining the quantity of the new investment.
The capital variables -availability of industrial credit and the productivity of capital -have virtually no influence on the location and quantity of new industrial investments. In fact, the capital-productivity variable has a negative sign consistently through both model sets (with the exception of the Utilities sector), and in the OLS Chemicals and Textiles models, it is also significant. In other words, districts where the output-capital ratio is high the tendency is toward little or no new investment, and that this trend is particularly true of the Chemicals and Textiles sectors. The implication is that districts with low output-capital ratios (that is, districts with capital intensive investments) are preferred. This is not puzzling as much as it is an indirect confirmation of the cumulative causation thesis which suggests that capital-intensity will tend to favour geographical clustering of industry.
Of the Labour variables, the variable with consistent significance is district population (POP-DISTRICT), which plays a positive role in attracting new industry (for all sectors except Textiles), but has little influence in determining the quantity of new investment (a small positive effect is noted for Heavy Industry, and, not surprisingly, a negative effect is seen for Utilities). The size of the available industrial labour force has some significance, but only in the logistic models. Labour productivity (PROD-LABOUR) is inconsistently significant -primarily for all industry and the Chemicals sector, and to a lesser extent the Utilities sector -where it has a positive role in both attracting new investment and on the quantity of new investment. Following the discussion in the preceding paragraph, this implies that capital-intensity of existing industry often plays a key role in attracting new investment.
The infrastructure variables have little overall significance in determining the location or quantity of new industrial investment. Physical infrastructure (PHYS-INFRA, which is an index of access to national highways, ports, and airports), appears to have some significance in the all industry, Textiles, and Utilities logistic models, but none in any of the OLS /Heckman selection models. This is a somewhat unexpected finding. Perhaps this finding is an artifact of the way the PHYS-INFRA index has been constructed. That, however, is unlikely, as this index was chosen after an extensive sensitivity analysis among a large number of indexes, including the option of using the three infrastructure elements independently. This finding is consequential because, in policy circles, physical infrastructure is considered the key to attracting new investments (see the much discussed India Infrastructure Report, Expert Group, 1996) . Yet, the models indicate that infrastructure does not play a role that is independent of clustering processes. In other words, the establishment of new physical infrastructure is by itself unlikely to generate new industrial investments, especially in lagging regions.
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The social infrastructure variables (literacy and infant mortality), not surprisingly, play no role in the new investment location decision. Literacy, when significant (or otherwise) is negatively related, and infant mortality is unrelated. One can understand, even if one cannot endorse, the unexpected literacy effect. Statistically, it is probably the effect of Kerala's combination of high literacy and low or no investment. But why should infant mortality have no effect? After all there is great variation in the levels of infant mortality, which averages around 60 in the south, rising to 100 in Rajasthan, 120 in Uttar Pradesh, and 150 plus in Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. One can hope that this is a statistical artifact and not an indication of a social reality where new investments seek locations with high infant mortality.
At the same time, the Socialist variable (a proxy for unionised labour, or the militancy of unionised labour) 12 is negatively related to both the existence and quantity of new investment. Perhaps the models are hinting at some story about the quality of labour that new investment seeks. Industrial labour presence is favoured, but not if it is strongly unionised; the labour need not be literate, in fact, literacy may work against attracting certain kinds of investment; and given that high infant mortality is indicative of poor social conditions and social infrastructure, the social conditions of labour need not be progressive. The evidence presented here is circumstantial -indeed, these models were not designed to examine the relationship between labour conditions and new investment -yet the trends are troubling.
Of the two spatial dummy variables, the METROPOLITAN dummy has no significance in any of the models, whereas the COASTAL dummy is weakly significant in some of the logistic models, and strongly significant in the OLS/Heckman selection models for all industry, Chemicals, and Utilities. The coastal bias of new investments (despite the absence of investments in Kerala) has already been noted in the maps and tables; similarly, the finding on metropolises is unsurprising given that we have already noted the relative decline of metropolitan districts.
CONCLUSIONS: CONCENTRATED DECENTRALISATION
It is clear that both in determining which districts get some new investment and in determining the quantity of new investment, the most significant factors are the existence and size of investment from the pre-reform period and the existence and size of new investment in the neighbouring districts. The first factor implies continuity -evidence of a historical process of investment location. The second factor implies clustering -evidence of the role of geography in guiding investment location. Both factors are stronger in determining success/failure rather than quantity. One implication of this is that though historical processes are being continued in the choice of investment location, the volume of new investments is following a different pattern from the past. In other words, districts that were successful earlier continue to receive new investment, but degree of past success is not the best indicator of the degree of current success. The most successful prereform districts are not the most successful post-reform districts. There has been a shift in geographical focus whereby new investments seek locations within the existing leading regions (or clusters), but at new locations within these regions. To use a concrete example highlighted earlier: Greater Bombay is still successful in attracting investment, but not to the extent it was earlier; its neighbours, Raigarh and Thane, are now the preferred investment destinations.
Can the Indian experience on industrial location be placed in the context of other developing nation experiences? There is evidence from South Korea [World Bank, 1999; Henderson, 1988; Lee, 1987] that as a result of liberalisation in 1980s, the reinstatement of local government autonomy, and heavy communication infrastructure investments by the state away from Seoul and Pusan, manufacturing industry has decentralised. Among other physically small countries, there is a clear trend toward regional deconcentration of income and industry in Colombia; see Câ . rdenas and Pontön [1995] on regional convergence and Lee [1987 Lee [ , 1989 on the deconcentration of employment at the metropolitan level. In Indonesia, a larger country, the summary data suggest that some industrial deconcentration has taken place during the reform period (the early 1980s onwards) in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, while government consumption expenditure and fixed capital formation have become more concentrated [Akita and Lukman, 1995] ; others note that 'these aggregate groupings … conceal important trends at the sub-regional level … There has almost certainly been a rising concentration of industrial activity on the fringes of major urban concentrations, such as Jakarta and Surabaya' [Aswicahyono, Bird and Hill, 1996: 356; also Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996] . Among countries that may be considered geographically comparable to India, the industrial location experience of Brazil has been widely studied. Townroe and Keen [1984] and Diniz [1994] have argued that 'polarisation reversal' has taken place in the state of São Paulo in Brazil, where an 'agglomerative field' with a radius of around 150 kilometres around São Paulo is seeing faster industrial growth than the city itself.
13 According to Diniz, however, interregional industrial polarisation into the South-east and the state of São Paulo continues.
Similarly, it appears that what is happening in India is quite distinct from 'spread' or 'polarisation reversal' in that there is increasing inter-regional polarisation of industry at the same time that there is intraregional dispersal in the leading regions. In other words, the situation is one of concentration with dispersal, or to make an ironic use of the term, 'concentrated decentralisation', where the new growth centres are in the advanced region rather than in the periphery.
14 Though the reforms of 1991 were used as the point of departure in the analysis, it does not follow that this concentrated decentralisation process is purely the result of the reforms.
First, according to some scholars, the reforms began with Rajiv Gandhi in 1985; second, it is quite likely that some elements of the process, especially that of metropolitan decline, were well under way before any such formal, sharp transition (in 1985 or 1991) . This raises the point that this study is unable to discern whether the changes are driven by changes in transport costs, agglomeration economies, or political action. I suggest that this is an issue of secondary importance, that is, relevant only at the intraregional scale. Remember that large parts of the country are marked by what has been termed 'intangibles' earlier in the article: Gujarat's entrepreneurial culture, virtual stateless-ness in Bihar, extreme labour militancy in West Bengal, knowledge-based cultures in the south and so on. It is possible that these elements of local political economy create the primary foundation on which interregional outcomes turn; that is, the industrial location decision is a two-step process. First, there is the decision on which general region to invest in, followed by the decision on the specific location within the selected region. The first decision leads to interregional divergence; the second decision may lead to intra-regional convergence (due to declining transport costs and/or rising agglomeration diseconomies). In India, the key is to device strategies that will influence the first decision.
final revision accepted November 2002 NOTES 1. Geographers have been interested in this phenomenon for some time. However, their work is curiously marginalised in mainstream economics and development economics -perhaps due to the different methodologies and epistemologies of the fields [Clark, 1998] , perhaps due to the analytical intractability of spatial parameters. As early as in the 1930s, German geographers theorised urban systems in terms of central place functions [Christaller, 1966] and systems of market areas [Losch, 1954] , using concepts like 'range of a good' (a transport-cost factor) and 'threshold population' in a hierarchical diffusion structure. 2. The share of total investment allocated to each sector is somewhat consistent. Gains have been made in the Heavy Industries sector, where the pre-and post-reform shares were respectively 33.4 and 37.2 per cent, and in the Chemicals and Petroleum sector, where the shares are 18.4 and 26.2 per cent; Losses have been in the Utilities sector with pre-and postreform shares of 30.3 and 25.2 per cent, in Textiles with 7.8 and 5.7 per cent, and in Agribusiness with 7.1 and 2.9 per cent. I will suggest later that the CMIE Agribusiness data are unreliable. 3. The maps show investment shares rather than per capita investment. There is little to choose between the two display methods. The latter method tends to de-emphasise the intensity of investment in the more heavily populated metropolitan regions; that is, a map of the distribution of shares tends to show more metropolitan and urban bias, but is also likely to provide a better sense of industry concentration. Moreover, as all the other data are reported in share rather than per capita terms, I have elected to present maps of investment shares. The per capita maps are available with the author. 4. These data do not include figures for Jammu and Kashmir and the far north-eastern states (Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalay, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim). Given the turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir, its data are unlikely to be reliable. In addition, all these states together accounted for less than 0.4 per cent of the total new industrial investment, almost entirely in utilities projects (typically hydel power), typically spread over several districts. Also note that the maps show data at the district level, but in order to minimise visual clutter, the district boundaries have not been drawn. 5. It is necessary to note that the government of Maharashtra takes this issue seriously enough to dispute CMIE's data. It feels that it remains the number one investment destination of the post-reform period, and has considered legal action to dispute these figures. (Personal communication from CMIE officials.) 6. The disparity in Madhya Pradesh between the maps and the actual investment figures is a result of the fact that investment is not evenly distributed within the state. 7. Andhra Pradesh is a bit of an anomaly. In popular accounts, the state led by dynamic Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu, is one of the prime beneficiaries of liberalisation (though in the same popular accounts, questions are now being raised about the early fulsome assessments.) The data here indicate that absent investments in the software sector (which is where AP has done well, and which are not included here), the state has lost its share of industry. 8. This may indicate that the post-reform or CMIE data for the Agribusiness sector are incomplete. In the pre-reform period, the Agribusiness sector had the highest level of clustering. It is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby this extremely clustered industry would suddenly lose the circumstances which enabled clustering in the first place, unless, as expected, there are missing data. Remember the caution about missing small projects in the CMIE data. Since the Agribusiness sector is most likely to be composed of small factories (in the ASI data, this sector includes about 23 per cent of all factories but only about eight per cent of invested capital and five per cent of fixed capital), it is likely that the CMIE data are incomplete for this sector. Henceforth, the results for the Agribusiness sector should be considered suspect. 9. For instance, the Kolkata metropolitan area includes the districts of Calcutta, Haora, Hugli, North 24 Parganas, and South 24 Parganas. Ahmedabad is the only city for which no additional (sub-urban) district has been added. 10. For instance, one of the reasons popularly discussed for Gujarat's success is the entrepreneurial culture of the local population which was supposedly kept under check in the previous regime of licences and controls. This kind of thesis is probably best tested using other methodologies (such as interview based detailed case studies), for it is difficult to create an objective index of entrepreneurial culture. 11. Does the inclusion of Physical Infrastructure as an explanatory variable introduce a problem of endogeneity? In other words, are both Physical Infrastructure and new investment endogenously determined in a larger system (represented by the rest of the explanatory factors identified here), and is there a reciprocal causal connection between the two variables? Had the two data series been taken from the same time period, that is, had Physical Infrastructure been represented by new investments in roads, ports, and so on, the problem of endogeneity would have been a serious one. However, as used here, the Physical Infrastructure data are historic, indexing a cumulation of infrastructure access indicators that predate the new investment data. There may indeed be a circular and cumulative relationship between the two variables (in fact, this relationship is theorised at the outset), but as analysed here there is no simultaneous relationship, nor are the determining factors the same. 12. West Bengal accounted for about 38 per cent and Kerala for over five per cent of the workdays lost nation-wide in dispute-related stoppages between 1985 and 1995 (calculated from Government of India [1997] ). 13. The idea of 'polarisation reversal' followed from Hirschman's notion of polarised development. This theory has been investigated by Richardson [1980] and Chakravorty [1994] . The latter has noted that the meaning of polarisation reversal depends on the definition of 'pole'. He argues that declines in inter-urban, intra-metropolitan, and intraregional concentration are all possible and likely in most developing nations, but interregional inequality and concentration are likely to endure in large countries. 14. The term 'concentrated decentralisation' has been used in the growth pole literature, where it meant that rather than scatter scarce investment resources around equally, 'small centers or cores are set up in the periphery, thus to some extent distributing investment but also taking some advantage of urbanisation economies' [Darwent, 1975: 553] . For about two decades (the 1960s and 1970s) the growth pole policy was considered a critical tool that could help realise agglomeration efficiencies while advancing the cause of inter-regional equity, making it one of the most discussed ideas in urban and regional development [Hansen, 1967; Lo and Salih, 1981] .
